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The paper studies the emergene and stability of ooperative behavior in populations of agents
who interat among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to hoose their
partners. The population is then subjet to evolutionary pressures, based on individual payos from
multiple enounters. A simple formula for signaling and reognition is introdued, whih allows the
agents to guess prospetive partner strategy and to refuse the game if the predited outome is
unfavorable. We present both algebrai formulation of the average payos and results of omputer
simulations of evolution of suh soiety. The simulations result in surprising variety of behavior.
We disuss possible interpretations of the results as well as relationship between artiial `omputer
time' and real time of possible soial and biologial systems that the model might be applied to.
1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of our work is to desribe a system of agents who interat pairwise in a simple
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games [1, 2℄. Based on results of suh enounters, suessful agents are
allowed to multiply, while the least suessful die out. We are interested in the evolution of suh
soiety, both in nal stable states and in transient phenomena. We assume that the two types of
strategies in PD game, the Cooperator and the Defetor, are pure strategies for eah agent, that
agents have no memory, and that agents may deide whether they would play the game in a given
pair or not. The agents an, moreover advertise or amouage their harater before the atual
interation (alled here a math) ours. They an also reognize the harater of other agents,
although not with perfet auray. The purpose of this signaling and reognition, important
espeially for Cooperators, is to avoid, as muh as possible, the mathes with Defetors. As a
result the mathes are no longer random, but show ertain amount of assortativity, i.e. tendeny
of agents to pair with agents of the same type.
Suh assortativity proves to be a way of defense of Cooperators against the Defetors, enabling,
in some irumstanes, the ooperation strategy to remain present and even to dominate the
soiety. In this paper we present extension of the model desribed in [2℄. We would start with
introdution of algebrai model whih inludes improved modeling of reognition of other agents
and subsequent ativities. The we would move to omputer simulations whih allow muh ore
exibility and unover interesting global properties of the system.
1.1. Notation and basis of the model
Let the total number of agents, onstant in time, be N . The number of Cooperators, at a given
moment is NC , the number of Defetors ND. Fration of Cooperators is denoted by x = NC/N ,
of Defetors by 1− x.
Eah agent (numbered i, j) is haraterized by three properties: strategy type t(i) (Cooperator
or Defetor), signaling strength s(i) ∈ [0, 1] and apability to minimize the error in reognizing the
other agents' strategy r(i) ∈ (0, 1]. The larger the value of s(i), the greater hane that other agents
would pereive the agent in aordane with its true type. (Obviously, for Defetors this would be a
disadvantage, so Defetors would invest in minimizing the signaling, whih orresponds to suessful
amouage). We propose the following formula for the probability of orret identiation of agent's
j type by agent i:
P (i, j) = 1− r(i) (1− s(j)) . (1)
∗
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2For r(i) = 1 the probability is simply given by the signal strength s(j). Signaling s(i) = 0
orresponds then to perfet amouage, as the probability of orret reognition would be zero.
Diminishing r(i) dereases the erroneous identiation, for r(i) → 0 agent i is able to orretly
reognize others almost regardless of their signal strength. It is well established that suh signaling,
to have useful value in showing (or hiding) real strategy must be ostly [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10℄.
Eah agent interats with numerous other agents in eah turn. The interation may be imagined
as two phase: during the rst part of the enounter both agents appraise eah other and take
deision whether to proeed (onsent to a math) or not. The deisions are based on their signals
and error redution apabilities. If both take positive deision the atual PD game ensues, with
the results depending on the true strategies.
We envisage here two basi situations. In the rst, eah agent initiates a speied number of
enounters k. For eah of the enounters the initiating agent and a randomly hosen partner
appraise eah other, if onsent is mutual math ours, otherwise the enounter is registered as
resulting in both agents staying single. We would all this approah singles allowed. The
other approah requires the agents to searh around until a suitable and onsenting andidate is
found. Eah agent must partiipate in k mathes. This must math approah results is dierent
dynamis of the population.
1.2. Simplied analytial model vs. omputer simulations
Simulating the assortative mathing desribed above is relatively straightforward. The values of
t(i), s(i) and r(i) are asribed to eah agent. Within eah iteration eah of the agents attempts to
interat with a speied number of others. Results of the enounters are summed and averaged.
After all enounters have taken plae, the payos of the agents are ompared and a fration of
the `best performers' are allowed to breed, replaing the harateristis of the worst performers
with their own. Additionally, a very small number of agents `mutate' their harateristis between
iterations to randomly hosen values within the bounds set for t(i), s(i) and r(i).
Details of the simulations will be presented in the later part of the paper. To help in our under-
standing of these results we introdue here simplied analytial formalism, based on assumption
that all agents in Cooperator and Defetor group have the same values of s(i) and r(i), equal to
averages within the group:
α =
∑
Cooperators
s(i)/NC , (2)
β =
∑
Defetors
s(i)/ND, (3)
rc =
∑
Cooperators
r(i)/NC , (4)
rd =
∑
Defetors
r(i)/ND. (5)
We would also introdue values of reognizability (by Cooperators) of Cooperators and Defetors,
α˜ and β˜, taking into aount the signaling and error redution:
α˜ = 1− rc (1− α) (6)
β˜ = 1− rc (1− β) (7)
We'll start with alulation of relative frequenies of various types of enounters in singles allowed
approah. For the `singles allowed' situation we have for enounters ending in mutually agreed
math:
FMCC = x
2α˜2, (8)
3FMCD = F
M
DC = x(1 − x)(1 − β˜), (9)
FMDD = (1− x)
2, (10)
where FM
XY
denotes frequeny of enounter initiated by agent type X , with partner of type Y and
resulting in mutual onsent to a math. Similarly, for enounters ending without mutual onsent
we have:
FSCC = x
2(1− α˜2), (11)
FSCD = F
S
DC = x(1 − x)β˜, (12)
FMDD = 0. (13)
In the alternative `must math' model agents are not allowed to stay single (whih may orre-
spond to situations where a single agent would not produe any outome). As only Cooperators
are disriminating in their hoie of aeptable partners, it would seem that the hange would
apply only to them. In fat, the `must math' model inuenes mathing frequenies for both
Cooperators and Defetors.
To ensure that there are no unmathed agents we introdue the following senario: if, during
the initial phase of the enounter, either of the agents does not onsent to a math, the initiator
looks around for another partner. In priniple suh searh might be repeated forever. Within our
model, mathematially the proess orresponds to fast onverging geometrial series.
Let's onsider rst enounters initiated by a Cooperator. Frequenies of possible outomes are
given by:
Initiator Partner Result Frequeny
C C Math xα˜2
C D Math (1− x)(1 − β˜)
C C No Math x(1− α˜2)
C D No Math (1 − x)β˜
Thus, the ombined probability that the enounter would lead to no math situation (and thus to
further searh) is
QC = 1−
[
xα˜2 + (1 − x)(1 − β˜)
]
< 1. (14)
We repeat the searh proess until mutual onsent is ensured, whih orresponds to summing
innite geometri series. For example, probability that C mathes with C is;
FMCC = xα˜
2 +QCxα˜
2 +Q2Cxα˜
2 + . . . =
xα˜2
1−QC
. (15)
Similar analysis may be performed for situations where the initiator is a Defetor:
Initiator Partner Result Frequeny
D C Math x(1 − β˜)
D C No Math xβ˜
D D Always Math (1− x)
4Here, orresponding QD = xβ˜ < 1. Finally we have full set of expressions for frequenies of
enounter results:
FMCC =
xα˜2
xα˜2 + (1 − x)(1 − β˜)
(16)
FMCD =
x(1 − x)(1 − β˜)
xα˜2 + (1 − x)(1 − β˜)
(17)
FMDC =
x(1 − x)(1 − β˜)
1− xβ˜
(18)
FMDD =
(1− x)2
1− xβ˜
(19)
1.3. Costs
To be able to model the evolution of our system we need to introdue the osts assoiated with
signaling and error redution, as well as the traditional payos of the mathing PD games. As
we try to keep our model natural, we propose a very simple linear form of ost of signaling. For
Cooperators we propose
SC(s(i)) = σs(i), (20)
where σ is a numerial onstant (one of system parameters). The Cooperators benet from being
reognized, but perfet reognizability (s(i) ≈ 1) is ostly. On the other hand, the Defetors,
whose aim is rather to deeive than to inform, would strive to redue s(i). In our approah suh
deeption tatis should be more expensive that normal signaling and inrease with 1 − s(i)→ 0.
We propose
SD(s(i)) = fσ(1− s(i)), (21)
where the additional fator f ≥ 1 reets the relative diulty of deeption over straight signaling.
Grafen showed how an honest signaling system is stabilized through ostly signaling: ost stabilizes
the system when the ost of lying is greater than any benet assoiated with doing so [11℄. It
should be noted that here we are interested in situations where the benets from suessful math,
espeially Cooperator-Cooperator and Defetor-Cooperator are higher than signaling osts. The
reason for this assumption is to investigate if even in those unfavorable irumstanes, where
the Defetor strategy is in priniple more protable, the ooperative strategy ould emerge from
nonrandom hoie of partners.
To estimate the osts of error redution we observe rst that there should be no osts if r(i) = 1
(i.e. when there is no error redution). Moreover, very small values of r(i), whih allow the agent
to perfetly reognize other agents, regardless of their true or deeptive signaling should be very
expensive. Thus we propose ost funtion for error reognition to have the form
RC(r(i)) = ρ
(
1
r(i)
− 1
)
, (22)
with 0 < r(i) ≤ 1. The same form RC is used for both Cooperators and Defetors. It should be
noted that intuitively, the error redution is quite unimportant for Defetors, as they agree to all
proposals. Thus, while `investing' in small but ostly r(i) should be important for Cooperators,
the investment is fruitless for Defetors. They would rather benet from minimization of osts and
keep r(i) lose to 1.
1.4. Payos and population dynamis
Frequenies of various types of enounters, payos from the enounters and osts of signaling
and error redution allow to alulate the general payos of the Cooperators and Defetors. The
5dierene between the payos determines then the population dynamis, leading to inrease of the
population of the agents with higher payo.
For the math results we use the traditional notation:
T > 0 Payo for Defetor in math with Cooperator (23)
R > 0(R < T ) Payo for Cooperator in math with Cooperator (24)
S = R+ P − T < 0 Payo for Cooperator in math with Defetor (25)
P Payo for Defetor in math with Defetor (26)
U Payo for any agent staying single (if it is allowed in the model) (27)
We further assume that P = 0 and U = 0. The assumption is made for simpliity and it is not
generally neessary to have P = U [12℄. However it is quite natural that the payo for eah of the
two Defetors working `together but eah by himself' in a math should be similar to payo of a
single agent  if ating alone is possible.
The average payos for Cooperators and Defetors, assuming that the agent initiates k enoun-
ters in eah iteration, are:
PC =
2kRFM
CC
+ kSFM
CD
+ kSFM
DC
x
− 2kSC(α)− 2kRC(rc) (28)
PD =
kT (FM
CD
+ FM
DC
)
1− x
− 2kSD(β) − 2kRC(rd) (29)
It is worth noting that we have assumed that the signaling and error redution osts are paid at
eah enounter while the PD games payos are paid per eah math (with P = U = 0).
1.5. Results of the analytial model
The model desribed in our work has relatively large number of parameters. These are: pay-
os from the PD game (T,R, S, P, U), parameters governing the osts (σ, ρ, f), initial fration of
Cooperators x0, and the values of average s(i) and r(i) for Cooperators and Defetors (α, β and
rc, rd).
Figure 1 presents examples of solutions of equation δ = PC − PD = 0 for a given set of payo
parameters, as funtions of α, β and x. Several surfaes, orresponding to dierent values of error
redution for the Cooperators (rc) are shown. The surfaes orrespond to points at whih δ = 0
in gures presented in [1, 2℄. Regions of δ > 0 bound by the shown surfaes lead to inrease of
Cooperator population (whih means inrease of x) and vie versa, regions of δ < 0 favor inrease of
Defetor population. In both models, the δ < 0 region starts from the x = 0 boundary. This means
that we expet the x = 0 (Defetor soiety) to be stable solution of the evolutionary proess, if the
starting onditions lie lose enough to x = 0. If the δ > 0 region strethes right to the x = 1 limit
then the other stable solution is the Cooperator soiety. On the other hand, if the surfae δ = 0
is folded as in the `must math' model we expet that there might be a stable mixed population
solution. Keeping α, β, rc xed allows us to predit the nal values of population omposition
based on initial omposition. However, if we allow the parameters to hange the population path
might wander through the available spae and analytial predition is not possible.
2. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
Computer simulations allow the study of the behavior of the soiety and its harateristis in a
truly multidimensional parameter spae. The simulations use the same osts and benets model as
the analytial formulation. We used a system with 1000 agents, eah of those initiates k enounters
in eah simulation iteration. Partial payos and osts from eah enounter are summed up. After
full yle of enounters the agents with high total payos are allowed to breed, while the agents with
low payos are eliminated from the population. Two breeding mehanisms were used. In the rst,
a ertain number of `worst performers' simply took on the harateristis of the `best performers'.
We all this approah `deterministi breeding'. Alternative approah of `probabilisti breeding' in
whih eah agent ompared her payo to another randomly hosen agent, and the worse of the pair
6opied the harateristis of the better (this approah is sometimes alled `learning model' [13℄). In
many ases results of the two breeding models were similar, but there were ases where signiant
qualitative dierenes ensued. This was true espeially, if the number of breeding agents N
breed
was small  in the learning model all agents an partiipate in breeding. In addition to breeding
dependent on agent's payo we have introdued small fration of mutations: N
mutant
agents would
assume randomly hosen values of t(i), s(i) and r(i).
As for the analyti model, the results of the simulations depended on the onditions of mathing
(`must math' or `singles allowed') and on the input parameters. Simulations with xed values of
sc(i) = α, sd(i) = β, rc(i) and rd(i) (that is simulations where the only the type t(i) of an agent
was hangeable) produed results in full agreement with preditions of the analyti model, with
the same stable population ompositions. On the other hand, simulations in whih more agent
harateristis (t(i), s(i), r(i)) were allowed to hange freely have led to surprisingly rih range of
outomes.
For some sets of simulation parameters the behavior of the system was very simple, for example
either the Cooperators or Defetors quikly dominated the system, and the oasional mutants of
the other type were strongly disadvantaged and eliminated. On other oasions, relatively stable
mix of Cooperators and Defetors develops, utuating a little around a value that depends on the
ost parameters. Suh situation for the `singles allowed' model is presented in Figure 2. The four
panels show, from bottom, number of Cooperators and Defetors, average values of signal strength
for the two groups (α, β), average values of error redution (rc, rd) and average payos. Starting
onditions used high value of Cooperator number (920 out of 1000) and random distribution of
signals and error redution. The simulation used deterministi breeding with top 200 performers
allowed to breed at the expense of the worst 200. Twenty agents were mutated at eah iteration.
The onditions neessary for suh `simple' behavior are usually those that allow one type of
agents learly reognizable advantages, for example large value of f  whih makes amouage of
Defetor ostly, or low value of error redution ost ρ lead to Cooperator dominane. On the other
hand high ost of error redution or high value of T over R leads to Defetor suess. For some
sets of input parameters the simulations result, however, in a muh more ompliated behavior,
whih an be interpreted, although not predited in detail.
A good example of suh behavior is provided in Figure 3, showing results of a simulation for the
`singles allowed' model. The only dierene from the input parameters of Figure 2 is the value of
ρ = 0.3 instead of 0.2, whih seems at rst glane a minor hange indeed. Yet the system behavior
is strikingly dierent.
The simulation results might be broken into several phases. Initially Cooperators dominated the
system. There are periods of total dominane NC ≈ 1000, where only ephemeral mutants were
Defetors. At other periods, the dominane although not absolute, was still in the range of 90% of
the population. In suh situation there was signiant evolutionary internal ompetition between
Cooperators. This led to a rae to minimize the osts, espeially error redution osts (faulty
quite unneessary in a fully Cooperator soiety), and thus Cooperators with higher rc (and thus
lower ability to detet Defetors) were preferred. This resulted in the observed growth of rc. At the
same time, the Defetors were seleted in a way that very strongly preferred suessful heaters
(β ≈ 0). This reated sitation where well amoueged Defetors ould invade the Cooperator
population. The periods of total Cooperator dominane have proven to be espeially prone to
being invaded. Several suh invasions (around iteration 50, 180, 215 and 1315) were ontained and
reversed, mainly beause the surviving Cooperators had low enough rc and were able to reognize
and isolate the Defetors. However, one of the invasions (around iteration 1450) oured at the
time where internal ompetition among Cooperators has pushed rc to very high level. Rapidly
diminishing number of Cooperators had not enough `geneti variety' and in the ourse of just 14
iterations Defetors totally dominated the system. Soon afterwards, internal ompetition this time
among Defetors has led to rd → 1 and β → 1 whih minimized the osts. Although mutation still
produed oassional Cooperator, in the purely Defetor soiety they were not able to ombine
the ability to detet Defetors and ooperate among themselves  and the Defetor dominane
has proven to be stable. The ompliated behavior presented here was observed in quite a few
simulations. While the general piture was reognizable, partiular aspets, suh as the number
of Cooperator dominated periods, or time of the nal suessful `Defetor invasion' diered for
dierent simulation parameters or even for dierent random number generator seeds.
The `must math' model has shown omparably rih behavior. In addition to simple results
of pure or mixed (but stable) soieties we have observed simulations with very dramati hanges
7in population omposition. An example is provided in Figure 4. Initially looking as a rather
boring x ≈ 0.6 system, it has entered wildly osillating `revolution' during whih within tens of
iterations soiety omposition hanged from Cooperator to Defetor dominane and vie versa.
The onset of these osillations might be traed to random appearane of some Defetors with
very low value of s(i), who were able to suessfully heat the Cooperators. The rapid yles
during the revolution resulted from internal ompetition among the dominant agents. For several
iterations the system was totally dominated by Defetors, during these periods the Defetors
gradually dereased their ability to pose as Cooperators (inreasing β) whih opened the way for
equally brief attempts by mutant Cooperators to gain strength. The Cooperator inursions lasted
also several iterations. The end of the `revolution' phase is equally rapid and mysterious. One of
the Cooperator invasions resulted in a group with suiently low rc value  enabling them to
suessfully reognize Defetors. Finally new equilibrium formed, with populations of Cooperators
and Defetors lose to the pre-revolutionary times, but with values of α, β and rc that bloked
the future revolutions. Even though we have tested our system through several thousands of
iterations the `revolutionary' phase was not repeated. It should be noted here that using slightly
dierent values of input parameters (inluding the random number generator seed) resulted in
similar behavior, although happening at dierent simulation timeframe.
So far we have presented examples of omplex behavior for a fully free system, in whih all t(i), s(i)
and r(i) ould hange within the available range. Some of the phenomena we have presented
were learly linked to error redution by Cooperators. It is interesting whether any omparably
ompliated ativity ould be observed in a system where there is no error redution. To test
this we have simulated the system where r(i) ≡ 1 for all agents. The only fators determining
agent reognition was the strength of the signaling, whether true or misleading. This situation
orresponds diretly to that presented in [1, 2℄. Generally, results of the simulations for suh
system were simpler, leading to more often to stable pure or mixed soieties. However, even suh
simplied model ould lead to quite omplex evolution of the system. Figure 5 presents repeating,
aperiodi yles of hanges in the population omposition for the `singles allowed' model. This
shows that simple onlusions from one dimensional analyses of earlier works might miss some
interesting aspets of the inuene of the assortativity of mathing proess to the emergene of
ooperation. The evolving system is apable of more than just onverging to xed points in
population omposition x.
One obvious property of the model is that in all situations where Cooperators dominate the
system, the average payo per agent is higher. Ahieving this group benet within biologi-
al systems where seletion ats on individual level (or even on the sub-individual gene level) is
diult, and happens mostly through mehanisms other than assortative mathing (suh as kin
seletion or reiproal altruism). It is, however, possible for soially onstruted systems (suh as
trading environment) to impose the onditions that would inrease the hanes of ooperativeness
to prosper. For example the universal standards of aounting and audit are a way of imposing
ostly signaling aimed at keeping out the Defetors. The ompanies an reognize prospetive
business partners `strategy' in PD game like senario by looking into publi nanial reords. This
would orrespond, in our model to putting f very high (as the osts of suessfully amouaging
ompany results are prohibitively high). In suh situations Cooperators have muh better hanes
to dominate the system in a stable way.
2.1. Simulation time vs. real time: the role of metastable states
An interesting aspet of any omputer simulation is the artiiality of the `iteration time'.
depending on input parameters, suh as the number of breeding agents or the amount of enounters
within a given iteration k the tempo of system evolution is hanged. In most ases, though, the
hanges of these parameters merely speeded up or slowed down the system evolution as measured
in iterations. Sometimes  for example when the number of breeding agents is small, qualitatively
dierent results are obtained, usually attributable to loally stable systems, for whih small number
of agents that are allowed to breed an not disturb the equilibrium. Yet it remains an important
task to nd any onnetion between this artiial time and real timesales of the phenomena we
set out to model, suh as biologial evolution of human (and non-human) soieties, or evolution
of ooperative behavior in various ativities, suh as eonomy or eduation. Diret mapping of
`simulation events' (suh as enounters and mathes) to real life ounterparts is in most ases very
8diult, as the simulation only athes one of the many faets of the real environment.
We would like to note that our simulations have used relatively large number of individual
enounters within eah iteration (between 100 and 1000). While suh number of enounters is not
unimaginable for small soieties or for merhant ativities (espeially in the eletroni ommere
age) the large number of iterations, orresponding to biologial generations or to suessful trader
or ompany `generations' is way beyond the sope of the general stability of the whole system. Fifty
human generations would span about 1000 years  timesale during whih hanges in external
onditions would bring make the onstant payo model of isolated soiety assumption totally
absurd. The same reasoning applies to the trade ativities. There are two onlusions from the
above observation.
First, for omparatively short lived soieties our model might still provide valuable insight, but
instead of the nal stable results the transient, metastable phases that we have noted, for example
in Figure 3 might orrespond to what we atually observe in life! Keeping the above mentioned
example in mind, we might nd high levels of ooperation form not beause they are ultimately the
most stable evolutionary solution, but beause the system timeframe is suh that the transition
to Defetor soiety did not yet take plae. For suh situation the initial dynamis of the system
plays a ruial role. Our simulations, starting from random distribution of signaling strength and
error redution usually have very short initial phase, lasting a few iterations, during whih the
system very quikly evolves to the initially preferred state. Whether that state is really stable or
just metastable beomes visible only after the internal evolution among the `winning' type of the
agent strategy fores the winners to redue osts.
The seond onlusion points out one very important example of a real system whih ould be
modeled with our approah, and yet last long enough for thousands of generations in relatively
stable environment. The system is the early human evolution, lasting indeed for many thousands
of generations, where small groups of hominids were working together, and where assortativeness
of mathing would indeed lead to inreased payo for group members and evolutionary benets.
The fat that urrent human behavioral makeup shows signiant fration of ooperative strategy
indiates that in this ase the `model parameters' were those leading to at least some Cooperators
surviving in long term. Whether in ativities having diret link to geneti trait transmission and
evolution (suh as mate hoie and hildrearing investment) or in simpler and more frequent ats of
group ativities (hunting, managing tasks impossible for single individual) the ability to reognize
a good prospetive partner plays a ruial role. Of ourse, the memory eets (totally absent in
our approah) play important part, but in reality the proess of hoosing the partner is sometimes
based on memories of previous enounters and sometimes on `rst glane' assessment (and therefore
on signaling and lie detetion) [3℄. It is possible to inlude the memory eet in our model (for
example by drastially diminishing the error redution osts for those agents that the initiator has
mathed with in the past). Suh a synthesis of willful signaling and memory based reognition will
be the subjet of future investigation.
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Figure 1: Isosurfaes of zero payo dierene for the analytial model as funtions of α, β and x, for
the model allowing agents to stay single (upper gure) and for the model where they must math (lower
gure). The surfaes orrespond to several values of error redution for Cooperators, rc. Red: rc = 0.20;
yellow: rc = 0.40; green: rc = 0.50; blue: rc = 1.00. Other parameters: T = 10, R = 6, S = −4, P = U =
0, σ = 1.00, δ = 0.30, f = 2.
For the `singles OK' model Cooperator payo is greater than the payo of Defetors for large enough
values of x and α and β. As a result, for xed α, β and rc there are either two stable outomes of system
evolution: x = 0 and x = 1, depending on the initial value of x (if the line α, β, x ∈ [0, 1] rosses the
isosurfae) or just the x = 0 result.
For the `must math' model, folded form of the zero isosurfae results in the mixed population being
possible. For values of α and β when the line x ∈ [0, 1] rosses the surfae at two points x
min
(α, β) and
x
max
(α, β) the evolution leads to x = 0 if starting value is smaller than x
min
(α, β), and to x
max
(α, β) if
starting value is greater than x
min
(α, β). The situation hanges for small enough values of rc, where the
surfae is no longer folded, and the two stable outomes are again x = 0 and x = 1.
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Figure 2: Results of simulation for `singles allowed' model. Green points: Cooperators, red points: Defe-
tors. Panels show evolution of number of agents of given type, average values of s(i) and r(i), and average
payos.
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Figure 3: Results of simulation for `singles allowed' model. Green points: Cooperators, red points: Defe-
tors. Panels show evolution of number of agents of given type, average values of s(i) and r(i), and average
payos. Further disussion in text.
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Figure 4: Results of simulation for `must math' model. Green points: Cooperators, red points: Defetors.
Panels show evolution of number of agents of given type, average values of s(i) and r(i), and average
payos. Further disussion in text.
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Figure 5: Example of results of simulation for `singles allowed' model with no error redution. Green
points: Cooperators, red points: Defetors. Panels show evolution of number of agents of given type,
average values of s(i) and r(i), and average payos. Further disussion in text.
